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Trust and Organizational Design: Explaining Cross-National 
Differences in Work Autonomy 
 
Abstract 
We open the black box of what goes on within firms in terms of how they organize and manage 
their operations. Work autonomy is a key aspect of firm organization and in this note we test the 
hypothesis that societal trust affects the level of autonomy that firms grant to their employees. 
Analysis of up to 189,213 individuals from 30 countries shows that trust is indeed highly 
conducive to work autonomy. This result is robust to controlling for a wide range of other 
features of countries’ institutional environment, including measures of labor regulations and 
quality of formal institutions. Our findings highlight the importance of societal trust in shaping 
economic activity. 
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1. Introduction 
In their effort to understand economic development, economists are increasingly digging 
beyond macro-level data on per-capita output, considering industry and plant-level variation in 
productivity (Syverson, 2011; Van Biesebroeck, 2008). Detailed analyses reveal wide and 
persistent dispersion in productivity levels among firms. To understand these differences, we 
have to open the black box of what goes on in firms that makes some firms so much more 
productive than others. Management practices and organizational design are an important part of 
the answer (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010), but only to the extent that they offer a new 
black box concerning the factors that drive heterogeneity in the way firms organize and manage 
their operations (Van Hoorn, 2014; Van Reenen, 2011). 
For some time, researchers have realized that trust matters for organizations. Fukuyama 
(1995), for instance, argues that within organizations trust can act as a substitute for family ties.1 
Along similar lines, La Porta et al. (1997) find that trust allows firms to increase in size while 
maintaining levels of intra-firm cooperation. In addition, recent empirical work by Bloom et al. 
(2012) finds that so-called bilateral trust, meaning trust between two countries, affects the extent 
to which multinational companies from a particular home country decentralize and give decision 
power to local managers in a particular host country. More generally, trust is linked to reduced 
uncertainty and lower transaction costs, which increases the extent of the market (e.g., Arrow, 
1972; Gambetta, 1988). Many studies subsequently show the benefits of societal trust for 
                                                 
1
 Cai et al. (2013) present evidence supporting this idea, reporting that managers who are 
relatives of the head of a firm are given more freedom to make decisions than are managers who 
lack such family ties. See Lu and Tao (2009) for macro-level evidence on how family ties can be 
substituted for by alternative enforcement mechanisms. 
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economic growth and development (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Dearmon and Grier, 2009; Knack 
and Keefer, 1997; see Algan and Cahuc, 2013 for a survey). 
This note contributes to an integration of the latter literature on the macro-level performance 
consequences of trust with the growing body of work studying the organization and management 
of firms. Specifically, we link societal trust to employees' level of work autonomy, which can be 
defined as "the condition or quality of being self-governing or free from excessive external 
control" (Jermier and Michaels, 2001: 1006). Granting workers a certain level of autonomy is 
associated with important advantages for firms. Specifically, following past thinking on the 
division of labor (e.g., Becker and Murphy 1992; Davis, 2006), a key advantage of work 
autonomy is that it increases productivity by sustaining more specialization in the production 
process. At the same time, granting employees a high level of autonomy can be disadvantageous 
for a firm, as reflected in the standard principal-agent problem. If a firm grants its workers 
complete autonomy, there are no formal governance mechanisms preventing these workers from 
maximizing their personal gain at the expense of the firm's interests. At this point, trust starts to 
play an important role, however, offering a mitigation of the principal-agent problem. 
Monitoring and control are simply less urgent when two parties can trust each other, i.e., when 
the principal can rely on the agent to act in the best interest of the principal without any explicit 
incentive to do so. Trust thus works to increase the overall benefits of work autonomy for a firm. 
This idea, in turn, leads us to expect that organizations grant workers more autonomy when the 
level of trust is higher, not just when the level of dyadic trust that a principal has in an agent is 
higher, but also—and perhaps more importantly—when the level of trust more broadly is higher, 
i.e., when societal trust is higher. In this note, we subsequently consider the following 
hypothesis: the higher societal trust is, the higher the level of work autonomy that employers 
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grant to their employees. 
 
2. Empirical approach 
2.1. Data 
The main source of the data used in this note is the well-known European Social Survey or 
ESS. We use the cumulative data file, covering all fives wave of the ESS (2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, and 2010). To extend and check the robustness of our baseline results, we supplement the 
ESS data with country data on control variables from a variety of sources. We exclude 
individuals with missing observations, leaving a sample that comprises up to 189,213 individuals 
from 30 countries, depending on the control variables that we consider. Although the ESS is a 
European survey, the sample is highly culturally diverse and covers the majority of cultural 
clusters recognized in the literature. Notably, Hofstede (2001), who is the leading cross-cultural 
researcher, identifies 12 culture clusters, seven of which are covered by our sample. In addition, 
our sample includes several countries not assigned to any of Hofstede's culture clusters, e.g., 
Russia and the Ukraine. Details on the ESS are available from 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org, which also provides access to the complete data set 
 
2.1.1. Measuring work autonomy 
There are different approaches to measuring what goes on within firms in terms of how they 
organize and manage their operations, including the level of autonomy that they grant to their 
workers. More than five decades ago, the "Aston project," named after Aston Business School, 
sought to measure organizational differences between firms in different dimensions including, 
for instance, so-called formalization (e.g., Pugh et al., 1963). The group's general approach was 
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to quantify organizations' scores on the different dimensions objectively. Formalization was thus 
measured by counting the proportion of employees who have handbooks and the total number of 
handbooks present in a firm, among others (Pugh et al., 1968). 
Work autonomy, on the other hand, is typically measured subjectively, by simply asking 
people how much freedom and independence they have in their job. Cai et al. (2013), for 
instance, combine survey items asking managers about their decision rights in specific areas (0, 
no decision rights to 4, full decision rights) to construct an overall index of managerial freedom 
to make decisions. More generally, management and organization scholars have long studied 
what workers actually experience in their job, as opposed to rules and procedures describing 
their job in some codified form. This area of research includes assessments of the level of 
autonomy that employees experience in their work (e.g., Pierce and Dunham, 1976; Sims et al., 
1976), the essence of which indeed seems hard to capture through examination of formal 
documents only. 
The specific survey item that we use to measure work autonomy asks respondents to say how 
much the management at their work "allows/allowed them to decide how their own daily work is 
organized" with answers ranging from 0, "I have/had no influence" to 10, "I have/had complete 
control." A potential disadvantage of this self-reported measure of work autonomy is that it may 
be too noisy or potentially biased and therefore does not capture any meaningful variation in 
people's actual level of work autonomy (cf. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). However, a 
standard validity check dismisses such concerns. Individuals' work autonomy scores relate to a 
variety of other factors in the precise manner as expected, indicating that the work autonomy 
measure is indeed valid in the sense that it captures meaningful variation in the level of work 
autonomy granted to people. Notably, managers have higher levels of work autonomy than 
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subordinates do and the higher educated are granted more autonomy than people with lower 
levels of education are (see Table A in Appendix A for details and further evidence). 
 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
 
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics on our measure of work autonomy for the sample as 
a whole (Table 1) and for each country in the analysis separately (Table 2). Country differences 
in work autonomy are large with mean work autonomy scores ranging from 4.27 in Croatia to 
7.53 in Sweden. 
 
2.1.2. Societal trust 
Following our interest in the macro-economic consequences of organizational design and 
management practices on the one hand and trust on then other hand, our main independent 
variable is societal trust. As is standard in the literature (e.g., Algan and Cahuc, 2013), we 
measure societal trust as aggregated responses to the classic survey item asking respondents: 
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too 
careful in dealing with people?" In the ESS, individuals can respond to this question using an 
answer scale that ranges from 0, "You can't be too careful" to 10, "Most people can be trusted." 
Country scores are aggregated across all five waves of the ESS to fit the idea that trust is a stable 
cultural trait with deep, historical roots (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Uslaner, 2008). We thus 
have one trust score per country (see Tables 1 and 2). Societal trust scores are also highly 
diverse, ranging from 2.60 in Turkey to 6.90 in Denmark. 
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<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
 
To consider the issue of causality we consider an alternative measure of trust, which is a pure 
trust measure that is not co-determined by reigning socio-economic and institutional 
circumstances. Specifically, we use the inherited component of trust for the year 2000, as 
developed in Algan and Cahuc (2010). As mentioned, when data are not available, we drop the 
country from the analysis (again see Tables 1 and 2). Inherited trust scores are available for 19 
countries (138,758 individuals) and range from -0.121 (Russia) to +0.114 (Finland). 
 
2.1.3. Control variables 
To test the robustness of our results, we consider a variety of potential confounders as control 
variables. At the individual level, we use gender and age/age-squared as standard control 
variables. As trust has been linked to education, we further control for individuals' level of 
education to rule out that results are perhaps driven by differences in education rather than by 
societal trust per se. We further find that trade union membership might be a confounder, as trade 
unions bargain with employees over labor circumstances, while union membership may be 
affected by the cooperative norms that exist in a society. Hence, we also consider a measure 
indicating whether an individual is a union member or not. The ESS provides data for all these 
individual-level controls. 
The potential importance of some of these individual-level factors notwithstanding, our main 
concern is that any relationship between societal trust and work autonomy is driven by 
unobserved country characteristics. We identify three (sets of) factors that seem problematic in 
this regard, as they appear likely to affect both the level of work autonomy that firms are willing 
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to grant to their employees and might also impact the level of trust that prevails in a society. The 
first set of these factors concerns the quality of countries' formal institutions in the areas of law, 
corruption, and democratic freedoms. We use the measures provided by the World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Indicators project (rule of law and control of corruption; World Bank, 
2013b) and by the Polity IV project (democracy; Marshall et al., 2011). These measures are 
available for all countries in the sample and can be matched to the year of survey of each wave 
of the ESS. The second set of factors concerns country differences in formal institutional 
arrangements specifically concerned with the governing of labor relations. We use the labor 
dismissal and labor regulations indexes developed by Botero et al. (2004), which are available 
for 27 countries in our sample. The third confounder that we consider is not a set of factors but 
simply the level of per-capita GDP. Data come from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2013a) and are again available for all countries in the sample, matched 
by the year of survey. Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics and country scores on the 
country-level control variables that we consider. 
Finally, we consider year/wave dummies as a way to control for any year-specific effects or 
idiosyncrasies due to differences in questionnaire design across the five waves of the ESS. 
 
2.2. Method 
Our sample is special in that it involves respondents who are hierarchically nested in higher-
order units, namely in countries. In the statistical analysis, we therefore separate variation that is 
between countries from variation that is within countries and model the variation at these two 
levels simultaneously, while taking into account the clustering of observations. Estimating such a 
multilevel model is advised for this type of data (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005), as it is 
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more appropriate than merely clustering our standard errors. Specifically, if we only correct for 
cluster biases in standard errors, we are merely dealing with a symptom of nested data and do not 
do justice to the actual peculiarity of having sources of variation that operate at different 
hierarchical levels. 
The formal empirical model reads as follows: 
 
( )jk0kk01jk10k0100jk euzβxβTγγA +++++= ,      (1) 
 
where jkA  denotes the level of work autonomy granted to individual j in country k, kT  is the 
level of trust in society k, jkx  is a set of individual-level control variables (e.g., gender), and kz  
is a set of country-level control variables (e.g., democracy). 00γ  is the mean (intercept) that is 
fixed over all countries. There are two error terms, one at the individual ( jke ) and one at the 
country level ( 0ku ). The model is a mixed model that combines random and fixed effects 
(McCulloch and Searle, 2001). Specifically, the country-level error term means that the intercept 
is allowed to vary across countries, where values for these country-specific intercepts can be 
obtained as posterior estimates. The method is Bayesian, applying shrinkage to draw outliers 
towards the sample distribution and allowing us to make inferences about the entire population 
of countries rather than just the sample. We estimate the model using maximum likelihood 
procedures. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Baseline results 
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Table 3 presents the basic findings for our empirical analysis of the relationship between 
societal trust and work autonomy. Initial results strongly support our hypothesis with trust 
correlating positively and statistically highly significantly with work autonomy (Model 1). More 
importantly, societal trust and work autonomy remain highly statistically significantly correlated 
when we include our individual-level control variables (see above) and year/wave fixed effects 
(Model 2).2 In fact, controlling for various individual-level features renders the coefficient for 
societal trust somewhat larger than before (see Model 1 versus Model 2). An estimated 
coefficient of 0.757 thereby means that moving workers from Turkey (lowest trust level; societal 
trust = 2.60) to Denmark (highest trust level; societal trust = 6.90) would increase their autonomy 
by 3.3 points on the 0-10 scale, ceteris paribus. Adding different sets of country-level control 
variables also does not change our results very much (Models 3-7). Finally, inclusion of all 
control variables simultaneously does not overturn our initial findings either, with societal trust 
still correlating statistically highly significantly with work autonomy (Model 8). Throughout, the 
coefficient for trust remains large, although adding country-level control variables tends to 
reduce effect sizes compared to models that include individual-level control variables only (see 
Model 2 versus Model 3 and Model 5 versus Model 8). 
 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
 
 
3.2. The causal effect of trust on work autonomy 
                                                 
2
 Models that have the same number of observations are nested, allowing us to use likelihood-
ratio tests to assess the statistical significance of changes to model specifications. 
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As stated, we affirm the causal effect of societal trust on work autonomy and deal with 
possible endogeneity issues by using the historical, inherited trust measure for the year 2000 
developed by Algan and Cahuc (2010). Table 4 repeats the main analyses from Table 3, but 
using this alternative trust measure. Although our sample is smaller than before, we again find a 
strong and highly statistically significant positive relationship between trust and work autonomy 
(Model 9). 
 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
Moreover, the effect of societal trust on work autonomy remains, also when we repeat our 
initial robustness tests and control for other potential determinants of work autonomy, both at the 
individual level (Model 10) and at the country level (Models 11-14). An estimated coefficient for 
societal trust of ±10 thereby means that moving workers from Russia (lowest inherited trust 
level; inherited trust = -0.121) to Finland (highest inherited trust level; inherited trust = 0.114) 
would increase their autonomy by 2.4 points on the 0-10 scale, ceteris paribus. Overall, we thus 
find strong support for the hypothesis that higher societal trust leads to higher levels of work 
autonomy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have sought to open the black box of how firms organize and manage their operations, 
showing that societal trust fosters the level of autonomy that firms grant to their workers. 
Management practices and organizational design are increasingly recognized for their vital 
implications, both for firms themselves but also for societies as a whole (Bloom and Van 
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Reenen, 2010; Syverson, 2011). Similarly, a growing literature is concerned with the macro-
economic consequences of trust (Algan and Cahuc, 2013). Our analysis contributes to these two 
developing literatures, showing micro-level ramifications of societal trust that may go on to 
impact economies as a whole. Future research may provide a more direct assessment, using 
micro evidence on trust as a factor shaping economic activity to pin down how exactly, i.e., 
through which channels, trust affects macro-level economic outcomes. 
 
Appendix A 
 
<< Insert Table A here >> 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variable and Key Independent Variables. 
Variable Sample mean Sample SD 
Work autonomy (0-10) 5.89 3.58 
Societal trust 4.94 .955 
Inherited trust (relative to Sweden, originally 0-1 scale) 
[n=138,758 / 19] -.010 .070 
Labor dismissal index [n=178,242 / 27] .499 .244 
Labor regulations index [n=178,242 / 27] .598 .160 
Rule of law 1.16 .783 
Control of corruption 1.17 .959 
Democracy (-10,+10) 9.46 1.25 
GDP per capita (2000$) 29,818 18,058 
Notes: Unless otherwise indicated, statistics pertain to 189,213 individuals in 30 countries. 
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Table 2. Key Dependent and Independent Variables by Country. 
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Austria 6.10 5.09 .052 .286 .501 1.88 2.07 10 33,774 
Belgium 6.44 4.95 .087 .143 .513 1.31 1.37 9.13 38,420 
Bulgaria 4.95 3.44  .143 .519 -.142 -.209 9.00 5599 
Croatia 4.27 4.38  .571 .488 .127 -.038 9.00 13,632 
Cyprus 5.97 4.22    1.16 1.14 10 26,708 
Czech Republic 4.32 4.39 -.098 .429 .520 .846 .328 8.93 13,974 
Denmark 7.37 6.90 .100 .286 .573 1.93 2.47 10 50,371 
Estonia 5.48 5.40    1.08 .907 9.00 11,931 
Finland 7.20 6.50 .114 .571 .737 1.95 2.42 10 40,678 
France 6.71 4.44 -.085 .857 .744 1.44 1.39 9.00 36,533 
Germany 6.20 4.71 -.049 .571 .702 1.66 1.80 10 36,766 
Greece 5.51 3.87  .286 .519 .764 .180 10 22,755 
Hungary 4.33 4.20 -.026 .286 .377 .859 .478 10 10,794 
Ireland 5.52 5.45 -.063 .286 .343 1.68 1.57 10 40,872 
Israel 5.99 5.06  .286 .289 .922 .857 10 24,036 
Italy 5.79 4.41 -.120 .429 .650 .612 .419 10 25,136 
Luxembourg 5.51 5.11    1.87 1.95 10 53,101 
Netherlands 6.54 5.82 .001 .714 .726 1.76 2.12 10 41,229 
Norway 7.30 6.67 .063 .714 .685 1.95 2.04 10 67,096 
Poland 5.09 3.98 -.089 .571 .640 .510 .280 10 9226 
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Table 2, continued. 
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Portugal 5.45 3.85 -.033 .714 .809 1.08 1.04 10 19,039 
Russia 4.49 3.98 -.121 .857 .828 -.901 -.998 4.64 8549 
Slovakia 4.45 4.08  .571 .657 .543 .333 9.79 13,644 
Slovenia 5.52 4.08  .714 .736 .946 .926 10 19,499 
Spain 5.95 4.98 .013 .714 .745 1.13 1.15 10 27,510 
Sweden 7.53 6.21 0 .714 .740 1.89 2.24 10 43,533 
Switzerland 5.68 6.61 .052 .143 .452 1.85 2.11 10 57,053 
Turkey 5.30 2.60  .286 .403 .093 -.038 7.00 7316 
Ukraine 4.33 4.12  .857 .661 -.802 -.836 6.49 2326 
U.K. 6.56 5.25 -.046 .143 .282 1.70 1.76 10 38,815 
Whole sample 
5.76 
(.973) 
[30] 
4.79 
(.992) 
[30] 
-.013 
(.075) 
[19] 
.487 
(.242) 
[27] 
.587 
(.159) 
[27] 
1.06 
(.796) 
[30] 
1.04 
(.962) 
[30] 
9.40 
(1.25) 
[30] 
27,997 
(16,962) 
[30] 
Notes: See Table 1. Number of observations in square brackets. Note that averages for the sample pertain to country-level 
observations and are not weighted by the number of respondents in a country as in Table 1. For this reason, the means of Table 1 and 
Table 2 cannot be compared. Country scores on Rule of law, Control of corruption, Democracy, and GDP are matched with the years 
of the ESS survey (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010). 
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Table 3. The Relationship Between Societal Trust and Work Autonomy. 
Dependent=Work 
autonomy (0-10) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Trust (0-10) .734*** (.119) 
.757*** 
(.123) 
.548*** 
(.122) 
.752*** 
(.128) 
.769*** 
(.121) 
.786*** 
(.128) 
.758*** 
(.118) 
.632*** 
(.129) 
Rule of law - - .160 (.114) - - - - 
-.046 
(.121) 
Control of 
corruption - - 
.114 
(.076) - - - - 
.113 
(.077) 
Democracy - - .049* (.023) - - - - 
.028 
(.023) 
GDP (/10,000) - - - .003 (.023) - - - 
.035 
(.024) 
Labor dismissal 
index - - - - - - 
-1.83 
(.904) 
-1.57 
(.836) 
Labor regulations 
index - - - - - - 
2.94* 
(1.38) 
2.68* 
(1.26) 
Individual-level 
controls and 
year/wave 
dummies included? 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
No. of individuals 189,213 189,213 189,213 189,213 178,242 178,242 178,242 178,242 
No. of countries 30 30 30 30 27 27 27 27 
-2Loglikelihood 1,004,907.7 990,836.9 990,825.7 990,836.9 944,867.3 931,782.5 931,778.1 931,771.6 
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2. Standard errors in parentheses. Clustering at the country level is taken into account. All models include 
random intercepts. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level (two-tailed). The labor dismissal and 
labor regulations indexes do not have time-series variation, but country scores on the other country-level control variables are matched 
with the year of the survey (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010). To save space, the table does not report coefficients for the standard 
individual-level control variables (e.g., gender), but these are available on request. 
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Table 4. The Causal Effect of Societal Trust on Work Autonomy. 
Dependent=Work autonomy (0-10) Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Inherited trust 8.91** (2.31) 
9.31*** 
(2.34) 
11.1*** 
(2.77) 
9.38*** 
(2.38) 
10.4*** 
(2.62) 
12.4*** 
(3.12) 
Rule of law - - -.078 (.137) - - 
-.057 
(.139) 
Control of corruption - - -.193* (.086) - - 
-.190* 
(.087) 
Democracy - - .080** (.026) - - 
.084** 
(.026) 
GDP (/10,000) - - - -.005 (.025) - 
-.012 
(.026) 
Labor dismissal index - - - - 1.15 (1.73) 
1.53 
(1.94) 
Labor regulations index - - - - -.380 (2.50) 
-.843 
(2.81) 
Individual-level controls and 
year/wave dummies included? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of individuals 138,758 138,758 138,758 138,758 138,758 138,758 
No. of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19 
-2Loglikelihood 727,231.6 716,159.4 716,142.0 716,159.4 716,157.8 716,140.3 
Notes: See Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. Clustering at the country level is taken into account. All models include random 
intercepts. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level (two-tailed). The labor dismissal and labor 
regulations indexes do not have time-series variation, but country scores on the other country-level control variables are matched with 
the year of the survey (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010). To save space, the table does not report coefficients for the standard 
individual-level control variables (e.g., gender), but these are available on request. 
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Table A. Validity of the Work Autonomy Measure. 
Variable Mean work autonomy (0-10) 
Manager  
Yes [n=54,252] 7.74    (2.58) 
No [n=134,769] 5.14    (3.66) 
Education (ES-ISCED)  
I, less than lower secondary [n=12,117] 4.66    (3.89) 
II, lower secondary [n=21,160] 4.64    (3.81) 
IIIb, upper secondary, vocational or no access V1 
[n=29,535] 
5.38    (3.67) 
IIIa, upper secondary, general and/or access to V1 
[n=27,573] 
5.64    (3.55) 
IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree [n=14,330] 6.44    (3.37) 
V1, lower tertiary education, BA level [n=13,356] 7.28    (2.77) 
V2, higher tertiary education, >= MA level [n=14,819] 7.36    (2.77) 
Allowed to influence policy decisions about activities of 
organization (0-10) 
 
0 I have/had no influence [n=53,450] 3.10    (3.65) 
1 [n=14,423] 4.16    (3.16) 
2 [n=12,051] 5.23    (2.84) 
3 [n=9897] 5.78    (2.57) 
4 [n=7392] 6.08    (2.37) 
5 [n=14,877] 6.70    (2.28) 
6 [n=9228] 7.30    (1.87) 
7 [n=11,302] 7.82    (1.71) 
8 [n=11,835] 8.36    (1.52) 
9 [n=6475] 8.87    (1.35) 
10 I have/had complete control [n=19,867] 9.81    (0.99) 
Notes: Number of observations in square brackets. Standard deviations in parentheses. Data are 
own calculations based on data from the ESS. ISCED stands for International Standard 
Classification of Education. 
 
 
